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LESSONS OF COMPETITION POLICY
REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES FOR
U.S. ANTITRUST POLICY
WILLIAM E. KOvAcIC*
INTRODUCTION
When I began my undergraduate studies in 1970, the
reading list for the introductory course in microeconomics
included Robert Heilbroner's The Great Ascent.' Published in
the early 1960s, Heilbroner's book urged American policymakers
to accept the need for "political authoritarianism and economic
collectivism" to spur economic growth.2  Emerging nations
deserved "the strongest possible encouragement-and not merely
a grudging acquiescence-in finding independent solutions along
indigenous socialist lines."3 Above all, Heilbroner concluded, the
United States "must forge a foreign policy which begins with the
explicit premise that democratic capitalism, as a model for
economic and political organization, is unlikely to exert its
influence beyond the borders of the West, at least within our
lifetimes."4
Few observers expected Heilbroner's premise to be proven
wrong so swiftly and decisively. To even imagine in 1970 that,
by the end of the twentieth century, only a handful of countries
would embrace central economic planning, would have
constituted proof of delusion. The economic and political
transformation of former communist and socialist countries in
Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
* Professor, George Washington University Law School. The author is grateful to
St. John's University School of Law for the opportunity to present an earlier version
of this Article at the Bernstein Lecture. The author thanks Kenneth Elzinga and
Luke Froeb for many useful comments and suggestions.
' ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE GREAT ASCENT: THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN OUR TIME (1963).
2 Id. at 148.
3 Id. at 150.
4 Id. at 149.
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the former Soviet Union is one of the most remarkable stories of
our time.5
To a striking degree, antitrust has been a component of the
mix of law reforms that transition economies have adopted to
move from central planning to market processes. 6 In the past
twenty years, over forty transition economies have enacted new
antitrust laws. 7 As many as twenty other transition nations are
considering the creation of new competition policy systems.8 In
1950, the United States alone had a robust system of antitrust
laws; by 2010, the number of countries with competition laws
could exceed 100, most of them consisting of former communist
or socialist states.9  Encouragement by and pressure from
Western countries have contributed substantially to the
establishment of new antimonopoly regimes. Advisors from the
United States and the European Union (EU) have played an
important role in shaping the substantive commands and
5 See William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and
Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from
Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1197-98 (1995)
[hereinafter Kovacic Reforms in Transitional Economies] (discussing the creation of
antitrust and consumer protection laws in former communist and socialist
countries); see also Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central
Europe: Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1129, 1129 (1994) (noting the vital role competition plays in the transformation of
systems from socialist to market based).
6 See William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls
on Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075, 1076-77
[hereinafter Kovacic, Merger Enforcement] (noting the role of competition laws in
the change from central planning to market processes).
7 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT & THE
WORLD BANK, COMPETITION POLICY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: A LATIN AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE (1997) (analyzing growth of competition policy systems in Latin
America); Ana Julia Jatar, Competition Policy in Latin America, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 357, 358-59 (1998) (reviewing adoption of new competition laws in Latin
America); Mark RA. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An
Empirical Analysis, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 105 (1998) (describing development of new
competition law systems); Russell Pittman, Competition Law in Central and
Eastern Europe: Five Years Later, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 179, 179-87 (1998)
(reviewing competition law experience in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Russia, and the Slovak Republic).
8 See Luis Tineo, COMPETITION POLICY & LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: FROM
DISTRIBUTIVE REGULATIONS TO MARKET EFFICIENCY 8-9 (Monterey Institute,
Center for Trade and Commercial Diplomacy, Working Paper No. 4, 1997)
(identifying candidates in the Caribbean and Latin America).
9 See Kovacic, Merger Enforcement, supra note 6, at 1077 (tracing the past and
projected development of antitrust laws).
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implementation mechanisms of the new antitrust laws.' 0 I have
participated in this process by working on competition policy
projects for the governments of Benin, Egypt, El Salvador,
Georgia, Indonesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Russia, Ukraine,
Vietnam, Guyana, and Zimbabwe. Transition economy officials
have frequently asked me and other foreign advisors to describe
Western antitrust institutions and to identify the best practices
of mature competition policy regimes."
Responding to questions about Western experience has
given me many opportunities to reassess the U.S. antitrust
system. While recognizing that distinctive national conditions
can make general recommendations problematic, the host
country reformers want foreign advisors to identify the types of
laws and implementing institutions they would propose if they
were starting with a blank sheet of paper. It is impossible to do
so without critically evaluating the system of one's own country.
This article examines existing American antitrust
institutions in light of the advice that Western observers often
give transition economies about creating new antimonopoly
regimes. The article considers several normative criteria for
antitrust laws that Western advisors tend to urge upon
transition economies, and measures U.S. institutions by those
criteria. I focus on six elements of guidance that foreign advisors
offer to transition economies: heads of state and legislatures
should appoint individuals with substantial relevant expertise to
head national competition authorities; institutional clarity and
simplicity are desirable objectives in designing enforcement
mechanisms; policymaking should be transparent; nominal legal
commands and actual enforcement policy should be congruent;
antitrust agencies should subject the results of their work to
10 See William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy
Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK J. INT'L L. 403, 406-08 (1997)
(describing contributions of foreign advisors); see also Roger W. Mastalir, Regulation
of Competition in the "New" Free Markets of Eastern Europe: A Comparative Study
of Antitrust Laws in Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak Republics, and their
Models, 19 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 61, 61-63 (1993) (discussing Western
assistance in forming antitrust laws in new market economies); A. E. Rodriguez &
Malcolm B. Coate, Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming Economies, 18 HOUS. J.
INTL L. 311, 327-29 (1996) (listing the Eastern European countries that received
help from the United States in drafting their antitrust laws).
11 See Spencer Weber Waller, Comparative Competition Law as a Form of
Empiricism, 23 BROOK J. INT'L L. 455, 457 (1997) (noting that foreign legislators
look to U.S. attorneys and agencies for advice about antitrust legislation).
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continuing evaluation, including scrutiny by outsiders; and a
high priority of competition law should be to forestall
government intervention that suppresses business rivalry. The
article suggests that the American antitrust system would
improve if U.S. policymakers embraced the advice that Western
officials often give to transition economy governments.
I. QUALITY OF APPOINTMENTS
Nominal legal commands, such as antitrust statutes, count
for little without effective means for their enforcement. 12 In
most countries, public enforcement institutions play the central
role in implementing competition policy commands, including
prohibitions on specific behavior, the preparation of enforcement
guidelines, and the performance of advisory and competition
advocacy functions inside the government. 13 To a large degree, a
country reveals the intensity of its commitment to enforce the
law through its choice of officials to head its public enforcement
institutions. The more capable the appointees, the more serious
the nation's intent to implement its laws effectively.
In discussions with transition economy governments,
Western advisors routinely emphasize the importance of
selecting highly qualified individuals to head new competition
agencies. Transition economy governments are told that expert
leadership is essential to the ability of antitrust agencies to
make sound enforcement choices and gain the respect of
business operators, consumers, and courts. Good appointments,
alone, are insufficient to ensure success, but without them there
is little point in trying.
12 See Kovacic, Reforms in Transitional Economies, supra note 5, at 1214
(noting that in the absence of implementing institutions, statutes may create more
problems than solutions).
13 See Roger Alan Boner, Competition Policy and Institutions in Reforming
Economies, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
38, 49-54 (Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1995) [hereinafter Boner, Competition Policy
and Institutions] (describing enforcement mechanisms in antitrust systems); R.
Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and Their
Relevance for Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 16, 27 (Claudio R. Frischtak, ed. 1995) [hereinafter
Ehemani & Dutz, Instruments of Competition Policy] (discussing the role of public
competition policy enforcement institutions); see also Bing Song, Competition Policy
in a Transitional Economy: The Case of China, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 387, 420 (1995)
(noting that because China's enforcement agency is weak, enforcement of China's
Unfair Competition Act does not look promising).
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A. The U.S. Experience: The Federal Trade Commission
In selecting leaders for its own independent competition
agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the United States
has followed its own advice about the importance of leadership
appointments halfheartedly.14 The selection of Commissioners of
truly outstanding ability in the FTC's areas of responsibility-
antitrust and consumer protection-has been unusual rather
than routine. For the FTC's first half-century, the overall record
of appointments to the agency was dismal.15  With rare
exceptions, the agency became an outlet for the political largesse
of the Congress or the President.16 Although the overall quality
of FTC appointments has improved since the late 1960s,' 7 it
remains the case in the modern era that few appointees have
arrived at the agency with significant experience in the fields of
antitrust or consumer protection.'8
Nor have the agency's Commissioners featured the diversity
of backgrounds in business, economics, and law that Congress
envisioned in 1914 when it created the FTC.19 Of the seventy-
14 See William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of
the Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 934 (1997) [hereinafter
Kovacic, Quality of Appointments] (evaluating appointments to the FTC); see also
ComIIS'L ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., APPOINTMENTS TO THE REGULATORY
AGENCIES: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMissIOw AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COM!ISSION (1949-1974) 391-92 (Comm. Print 1976) (study by James M. Graham
& Victor H. Kramer) [hereinafter Graham & Kramer, APPOINTMENTS] (noting that
candidates for nomination are chosen only if politically acceptable, while
qualification and ability are not required).
15 See Kovacic, Quality of Appointments, supra note 14, at 930-33 (recounting
the views of blue-ribbon groups and individual commentators on the quality of FTC
appointees from 1914 through the 1960s).
16 In 1976, two scholars published a scathing study of appointments to the FTC
and the Federal Communications Commission from 1949 through 1974. The authors
said:
Commission seats are good consolation prizes for defeated Congressman;
useful runner-up awards for persons who ricochet into the appointment as
a result of a strong yet unsuccessful campaign for another position;
appropriate resting berths for those who have labored long and hard in the
party vineyards; and a convenient dumping ground for people who have
performed unsatisfactorily in other more important Government posts.
Graham & Kramer, APPOINTMENTS, supra note 14, at 391.
17 See Kovacic, Quality of Appointments, supra note 14, at 934-35 (noting that
the FTC's membership has increased in capability since 1969).
18 See id. at 935-39 (describing trends in appointments since 1969).
19 See id. at 918-22 (discussing congressional expectations in 1914 for
qualifications of FTC Commissioners); see also William H. Hardie III, The
Independent Agency After Bowsher v. Synar. Alive and Kicking, 40 VAND. L. REV.
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three individuals who have served as FTC Commissioners,20 only
four have been economists or individuals with graduate degrees
in business administration.21 Only six of the FTC's seventy-
three Commissioners have had business backgrounds at the time
of their appointment. 22 No person with substantial experience as
a business manager has been appointed to the FTC since 1929.2
Appointments to the FTC during the Clinton Administration
exemplify the recurring weaknesses of the selection process.
President Clinton has appointed two members, Thomas Leary
and Robert Pitofsky, of unquestioned prominence and
achievement in the subject matter of the Commission's
jurisdiction. Clinton's other appointees include an attorney with
no previous experience in the field (Christine Varney); an
attorney with no antitrust or consumer protection experience but
with expertise in intellectual property (Sheila Anthony); an
attorney with a limited background in antitrust but with private
practice experience in corporate dealmaking and experience as a
public official in public finance and privatization (Mozelle
Thompson); and a former political advisor who is neither an
attorney nor an economist (Orson Swindle). Five of the Clinton
appointees are lawyers, none are economists, and none have
substantial experience as business managers (although Leary
served in the General Counsel's office of General Motors).24
By some standards, one could say that this pattern of
appointments is acceptable. All of Clinton's appointees are
bright and capable individuals. Like a number of their
903, 911 (1987) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court review of the intent by Congress
that the FTC be a "body of experts").
20 From 1915 to September 1997, a total of 69 individuals had served as FTC
Commissioners. See Kovacic, Quality of Appointments, supra note 14, at 954-56(listing the FTC Commissioners and their dates of service). From September 1997
through January 2000, four other individuals-Sheila Anthony, Thomas Leary,
Orson Swindle, and Mozelle Thompson-were appointed to the Commission. See
Federal Trade Commission Commissioners (last modified Jan. 28, 2000)
<http'//www.ftc.gov/bios/commissioners/htm>.
21 See Kovacic, Quality of Appointments, supra note 14, at 936 (identifying
those FTC appointees who were economists or held MBA degrees).
22 See id. at 935 (discussing the appointment of Commissioners with business
backgrounds).
23 See id. at 935-36 (noting that the last confirmation of a candidate with a
business background was Charles H. March, Commissioner from 1929-1945).
24 For short biographical sketches of Commissioner Leary and his FTC
colleagues, see Federal Trade Commission Commissioners (last modified Jan. 28,
2000) <http//www.ftc.gov/bios/commissioners.htm>.
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predecessors, those who initially lacked substantial expertise in
the FTC's areas of responsibility have gained relevant knowledge
on the job. After all, one might reason, antitrust and consumer
protection are not neurosurgery. In the course of a practicing
career, many economists and lawyers with no substantial
expertise in antitrust or consumer protection operate, in at least
some sense, at their periphery and acquire a general awareness
of what these areas involve. During a year or so at the
Commission, an intelligent person can absorb enough knowledge
about the relevant substantive and institutional frameworks to
achieve respectable work.
This undemanding measure of quality has become the
standard for evaluating appointments to the FTC. Such a
standard is entirely unsatisfactory. The universe of individuals
with extensive expertise in consumer protection and competition
policy in the United States is incomparably large and richly
diverse by any benchmark of demography or political
perspective. There is no human capital barrier to selecting
Commissioners who not only are intelligent and respected as
professionals but are also unmistakably expert in the fields of
antitrust or consumer protection at the time of their
appointment. It would be fascinating to know how the Clinton
White House-or, indeed, any earlier presidential
administration-performed its search for FTC Commissioners.
How did the White House identify the candidates? Who was
asked to be considered for the position? Of all those who
welcomed consideration, which names appeared on the "short
list" of prospective nominees? Why did the White House believe
its chosen nominees were best suited to join the Commission?
What contribution did the U.S. Senate, in exercising its
confirmation powers, make to ensuring that the search was
broad and rigorous?
One suspects that the outcome of such a study would be
embarrassing. There was probably no routine systematic effort
of the type suggested above to seek out potential nominees with
distinguished backgrounds in economics or the law of antitrust
or consumer protection.25 For the Clinton White House and the
25 See ROBERT A. KATzMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL
TRADE COlHlSSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY 135 (1980) [hereinafter KATZMANN,
REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY] (discussing appointments to the FTC and observing
that "[ulsually the White House does not actively search for qualified individuals
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Senate to do no better than have two of six appointees since 1993
take Commissioner positions with substantial relevant
substantive expertise is indefensible and cannot be explained by
limitations in the talent pool. There is no principled reason for
failing to make each appointment count towards increasing the
agency's capability and prestige. Only a conscious decision to
dispense political patronage or reward accomplishments
unrelated to the protection of competition or consumers can
explain such lackluster results.
B. The Transition Environment
The contrast between the level of commitment by the United
States to make top quality appointments to the FTC and the
degree of effort by various transition economy competition
authorities to select superior leaders for their competition
agencies is jarring. Many transition economies have allocated
precious human capital-individuals with substantial
background in market-oriented economics or law-to leadership
positions in their new competition agencies. 26 In these countries,
progress toward creating sturdy foundations for public
enforcement is directly attributable to inspired appointments to
top management positions in the competition agency.27
Current and former transition economy officials, such as
Beatriz Boza of Peru, Rafael Carles of Panama, Anna Fornalczyk
of Poland, Ana Juliar Jatar of Venezuela, Gesner Oliveira of
Brazil, and Olexander Zavada of Ukraine, would be proud
additions to the Western competition agencies that have given
these same transition economy officials advice. It is difficult to
overstate the dedication, technical skills, and leadership
qualities of these individuals and many of their colleagues in the
transition economy environment. A closer look at experiences in
but reacts to campaigns waged by candidates or their sponsors").
26 See William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law
Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INTL L. &
PoL'Y 437, 468-70 (1996) [hereinafter Kovacic, Law Reform] (discussing Poland's
and the Ukraine's appointments of experienced individuals to competition agencies);
Song, supra note 13, at 420 (noting that because competition policy is so
complicated, it requires highly qualified people, and therefore Taiwan selects
commissioners for its competition agency from those experienced in law, economics,
and finance).
27 See Kovacic, Law Reform, supra note 26, at 468-70 (describing the
importance of leadership in the success of new transition economy competition
agencies).
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Brazil and Peru illustrates how a number of transition
economies have taken the appointment of competition agency
leaders more seriously than the United States takes the selection
of FTC Commission members.
1. Brazil
In Brazil, the principal competition policy authority is the
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica (CADE).28 For
several days in August 1998, I visited CADE's headquarters in
Brasilia. I spent a considerable amount of time discussing
competition policy issues with CADE's six commissioners 29 and
attended a public meeting at which CADE discussed a pending
merger. In private conversations, each of the CADE
commissioners revealed a sophisticated understanding of both
the technical details and broader policy considerations of
competition policy analysis. Their backgrounds suggested why
this was so. Three commissioners had doctorates in economics or
finance. Two held doctoral degrees in law (the equivalent of the
JSD degree in the United States) and had written their
dissertations on topics involving competition policy. The sixth
commissioner held an LL.M degree from the Harvard Law
School and was writing his JSD dissertation for a Brazilian
university on merger policy.
The expertise of the CADE commissioners was apparent
during the public meeting on the merger. All six CADE
members participated in a free-wheeling discussion of the
transaction. They addressed previous CADE merger decisions
and examined the transaction in light of current developments in
doctrine and policy in the EU and the United States. The
members debated fine points of the EU and United States
merger guidelines, judicial decisions, and the recent academic
literature from economic and legal commentators. I wonder
whether the current FTC could conduct a comparable discussion
28 For a discussion of the operation of CADE, see Michael G. Cowie & Cesar
Costa Alves de Mattos, Antitrust Review of Mergers, Acquisitions, and Joint
Ventures in Brazil, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 113 (1999); see also Gesner Oliveira,
Competition Policy in Brazil and MERCOSUR: Aspects of the Recent Experience, 24
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 465 (1998) (discussing CADE's development).
29 CADE's enabling statute provides for seven commissions. There was one
vacancy at the time of my visit. For information about the structure of CADE, see
Administrative Council of Economic Defense (visited Mar. 15, 2000)
<http://www.mj.gov.br/cadeinicial.htm>.
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about a merger in which all five commissioners, without the
prompting of their advisors, demonstrated a comparable mastery
of the substantive competition policy issues.
2. Peru
Peru's competition policy body is the National Institute for
Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property
("Indecopi). 30 Indecopi is distinctive among new competition
policy systems in several respects. The first is its institutional
form. Indecopi consolidates several competition-policy related
functions into a single organization.31  Indecopi has three
"jurisdictional bodies." The first is the Free Competition
Chamber, which consists of seven separate Commissions
responsible for Free Competition, Dumping and Subsidies,
Consumer Protection, Repression of Unfair Competition,
Technical and Commercial Standards, Market Access, and
Market Exit (Bankruptcy).32 The second jurisdictional body is
the Intellectual Property Chamber, which has separate Offices
for Trademark, Patent, and Copyright issues.33 Rulings of the
individual Commissions and Offices are subject to review by the
third jurisdictional unit, the Tribunal for the Defense of
Competition and Intellectual Property, whose decisions may, in
turn, be appealed directly to Peru's Supreme Court.34
Two aims have motivated Peru's decision to combine these
functions into one institution. The first is to ensure that
government policies in a variety of distinct areas that affect
competition facilitate the accomplishment of market-oriented
goals. This includes ensuring that the attainment of pro-
competition objectives-ordinarily associated with antitrust
law-is not undercut by the pursuit of competition-suppressing
30 See PERU'S EXPERIENCE IN MARKET REGULATORY REFORM 1993-1998
(Beatriz Boza ed., 1998) (hereinafter PERU'S EXPERIENCE) (documenting Indecopi's
creation and activities); see also A. E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, Recent
Decisions by the Venezuelan and Peruvian Agencies: Lessons for the Export of
Antitrust, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 147, 171-72 (1998) (discussing the establishment of
Indecopi).
31 See Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 30, at 171-72 (discussing Indecopi's
provisions for enforcement, regulation, and administrative courts).
32 See id. at 15-18 (describing these commissions as the enforcers of antitrust
law).
33 See id. at 17-18 (describing these officers as responsible for regulation of
intellectual property).
34 See id at 17.
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policies in consumer protection enforcement or anti-dumping
programs. The second rationale is to make the best use of a
comparatively limited pool of specialists with training in market-
oriented economics and law. Like many transition economies,
Peru does not yet have access to a large reservoir of individuals
with formal training or experience in competition law or
industrial organization economies. Rather than attempt to
create a number of new institutions with more narrowly defined
responsibilities, the unification of competition-related functions
in one body enables a core team of specialists to apply their skills
to a variety of problems posing related conceptual issues.
Indecopi's experience is noteworthy for reasons beyond its
institutional novelty. The first is the exceptional capability of its
leadership. Overseeing the operations of Indecopi, which now
employs approximately 300 individuals, is a Board of Directors,
headed by its president. From January 1995 until August 2000,
Indecopi's president was Beatriz Boza. In recent years, the
global competition policy community has not seen a leader more
impressive than Boza. With a J.D. from the Pontificia
Universidad Catolica del Peru and an LL.M. from the Yale Law
School, Boza spent several years with Shearman & Sterling's
New York office before returning to Peru to head Indecopi. Her
powerful vision of a market-oriented legal framework and
charismatic style enabled her to attract first-rate attorneys and
economists-many with advanced degrees from Western
universities-to Indecopi. Within Peru, Indecopi has become a
coveted career opportunity for the top graduates from the
country's economics departments and law schools.
Boza's vision is reflected in the efforts Indecopi has devoted
to building a sound institutional foundation for developing
substantive policies. In addition to assembling a superb
professional staff, Boza devoted the first years of the agency to
establishing administrative structures, procedures, and
activities that ensure consistency and integrity in the agency's
operations and imbue the institution with widely-accepted
methodologies and values that will survive the departure of
individual managers or operational personnel. Indecopi has also
clearly understood the value of education, publicity, and other
outreach efforts in the early stages of a competition policy
institution in a transition environment. Among other strategies,
Indecopi has emphasized the distribution of consumer
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
information and the informal mediation of disputes as ways to
make the country's new market-oriented laws accessible to
consumers and business operators.
C. The Complacent U.S. Competition Policy Community
Measured by the overall quality of appointments, the FTC
fares poorly compared to Brazil, Peru, and a number of other
transition economies. It might be comforting to assume that the
limited competition policy expertise of various FTC appointees is
invisible to the transition economy audience. This is not so.
Though they lack extensive hands-on experience in
implementing competition laws, many transition economy
officials have studied the U.S. experience carefully and know the
backgrounds and accomplishments of the FTC Commissioners
who appear before them in international forums. In public, the
transition economy officials effusively praise even the most
modestly qualified FTC Commissioners. Privately, they express
surprise to see that a number of FTC Commissioners have little
background in antitrust or consumer protection and have
acquired their familiarity with these fields on the job.
The unimpressive quality of many FTC appointments is
made possible, in part, by the passivity of the antitrust bar that
practices before the Commission and the business community
that is subject to its decisions. Practitioners and affected
business operators fear that a nominee lacking preeminence in
antitrust or consumer protection may punish critics if confirmed.
Even to raise the issue of appointments for public discussion
might displease incumbent Commissioners who might not have
been selected if their own appointments had been tested by a
rigorous expertise standard ex ante. The American Bar
Association's Section of Antitrust Law has occasionally issued
blue ribbon studies that question the quality of past FTC
appointments, but usually in terms so mild and oblique as to be
meaningless.35 The ABA and the rest of the antitrust bar
scrupulously avoid confronting deficiencies in proposed
appointments. Aside from grumbling that takes place in private
conversations, the antitrust community meekly accepts
35 See Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Special
Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, reprinted in 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 118 (1989) (stating that the special committee was "troubled by
the uneven quality of FTC appointments").
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uninspiring nominees as though an immutable law of nature
ordained their appointment.
Like many members of the U.S. antitrust community, I once
subscribed to a policy of praising FTC appointments in public
and criticizing weaker nominees privately and quietly. A
consulting trip to Kiev in 1994 to work with Ukraine's
Antimonopoly Committee (AMC) changed my mind on this
issue.3 6 During a seminar for the AMC's professional staff on the
institutional prerequisites for success of competition agencies, I
stressed the importance of good appointments to key leadership
positions. One seminar participant asked me to assess the
quality of the FTC Commissioners. At first I was tempted to say
that the FTC appointees, though not uniformly strong, were
generally experts in the Commission's areas of responsibility.
Before I spoke, I noticed that the audience was watching
attentively to see how I would respond. This was not an
innocent inquiry. It was a test: would the Western visitor speak
the party line or answer candidly?
I directly acknowledged that the history of appointments to
the FTC was disappointing. Had I dissembled, the Ukrainians
would have doubted anything else I might have said. My
questioner had studied the issue and knew the relevant history.
He and his colleagues would immediately detect an evasion. The
Ukrainians also were aware that their own government had
appointed a number of first-rate individuals to the AMC.
Ulkraine's effort to find capable commissioners highlighted the
comparatively feeble commitment of the United States to find
truly superior nominees for the FTC. If Ukraine can find
commissioners such as Olexander Zavada, Svetlana Moroz, and
Andrei Melnichenko to the AMC, it hardly asks too much of the
United States to make every appointment to the FTC reflect the
extraordinary capabilities of the country's antitrust and
consumer protection talent pool.
II. RATIONALITY IN THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
A central issue in the design of new competition policy
institutions in transition economies is the proper structure of
36 For a discussion of the organization and operation of Ukraine's Antimonopoly
Committee, see Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in
Ukraine, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1997).
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public enforcement.37 The conventional wisdom of Western
advisors is that transition economy governments should seek to
establish rational mechanisms for enforcing the law. Rationality
dictates that competition systems should clearly delineate
enforcement responsibilities and ensure clarity and consistency
in articulating government policy.38 Increases in the complexity
of enforcement structures must be justified by their capacity to
improve the implementation of the law. For example, some
diversification of the sources of enforcement power may be
appropriate as a safeguard against default by the principal
public prosecutorial body.39  Concerns about enforcement
structures reflect the awareness that the choice of institutional
design for implementation can greatly affect the substance of
public policy.40
The U.S. antitrust enforcement scheme fares poorly when
measured by this criterion. An extraordinary number of public
authorities share power to enforce the nation's competition
laws.41 In sectors such as communications and energy, a vast
collection of federal, state, and municipal bodies assert power
under the antitrust laws and various other statutes to assess the
competitive significance of individual mergers. One could never
37 See generally Kovacic, Reforms in Transitional Economies, supra note 5, at
1209-14 (discussing the importance of institutional design to the successful
operation of antitrust and consumer protection laws).
38 See id. at 1214 (stating that without rational mechanisms to implement
antitrust and consumer protection laws, such laws may create more harm than
good).
69 See Khemani & Dutz, Instruments of Competition Policy, supra note 13, at 27
("Granting sole enforcement power to an organ of the government invites problems
related to lack of transparency, corruption, and misuse of power.... ."); Stephen
Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies' Bi-Modal Penalties, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 161 (1997) (summarizing the benefits of private
enforcement as a complement to public enforcement of antitrust laws in the United
States).
40 See Colin Scott, Institutional Competition and Coordination in the Process of
Telecommunications Liberalization, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION
AND COORDINATION 382 (Joseph McChahery et al. eds., 1996) (analyzing how
different constitutional and institutional arrangements yielded contrasting
telecommunications policy outcomes in the United States and the EU, respectively);
Gary Hewitt, Background Note, 1 OECD J. COMP. L. & POLY 177 (1999) (reviewing
the interrelationship between institutional regulatory design and the substance of
competition policy).
41 See William E. Kovacic, The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law, 30
ECON. INQUIRY 294, 295 (1992) (stating that consumers, antitrust agencies, state
attorneys general, and others have standing to bring antitrust actions).
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imagine that an external advisor would urge a transition
economy to emulate an enforcement mechanism that is so prone
to fragment policymaking responsibility, generate inconsistent
outcomes, and increase the costs of executing the law.
A. Decentralizing the Decision to Prosecute
More than any other system of antitrust enforcement, the
United States has decentralized prosecutorial power. Statutes
and case law confer standing on two federal agencies, the
Department of Justice and the FTC, and a variety of other
"persons," including state attorneys general, consumers, and
business enterprises. 42 The multiplicity of prosecutorial agents
severely limits the ability of any single agent to establish
consistent enforcement policies.43 Unless Congress or the courts
establish binding rules that apply to all prosecutorial agents,
any single agent can undermine policy adjustments undertaken
or sought by other agents. 4
Two principal features of the public enforcement mechanism
deserve reassessment. The first is dual federal enforcement. In
theory, having two public institutions compete to perform the
same service could reduce the cost and improve the quality of
that service. In practice, however, there is scant evidence that
dual federal enforcement by the FTC and the Justice
Department to prosecute the same antitrust commands and
make policy concerning the same industrial phenomena has
improved the application of the antitrust laws.45 Congress's
experimentation with dual federal enforcement by creating the
FTC in 1914 was sensible, but actual experience has not
vindicated the legislative expectations that inspired that
experiment.46  American advisors do not recommend that
transition economies duplicate the dual enforcement experiment.
A second troubling aspect of the distribution of public
42 See id. at 295-96 (analyzing the structure of U.S. antitrust enforcement and
its implications for the development of antitrust policy).
43 See id. at 295 ("No single gatekeeper controls access to the courts or
determines what ideas may be asserted to support antitrust claims.").
4 See id. (noting that the rejection of certain theories by one institution does
not restrain other institutions from adopting them).
45 See William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual Federal
Enforcement?, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 522-35 (1996) (assessing the contributions
of dual federal enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws).
46 See id. at 522-35 (discussing experience with FTC antitrust enforcement).
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enforcement power involves the role of state antitrust bureaus.
The delegation of prosecutorial power to state governments can
impede the development of rational national public enforcement
policies. 47  In a number of areas of antitrust policy, state
governments can curb efforts by the federal antitrust agencies to
design and execute coherent competition policy.48 The restrictive
effect of state participation is greatest when state officials object
to federal efforts to retrench antitrust enforcement.
The costs of having parallel federal and state review of
business behavior under the federal antitrust statutes are
especially evident in several areas of antitrust enforcement.
Perhaps the most noteworthy involves controls on mergers and
distribution practices. The policies of the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) toward mergers are materially more
restrictive than the policies of the federal antitrust agencies. 49
NAAG's 1993 Horizontal Merger Guidelines °  deviate
significantly from the federal merger guidelines by expanding
the range of circumstances in which the states will attack
proposed acquisitions.5 1 As a matter of law, the decision of a
federal agency concerning a merger does not preclude the states
from attacking the same transaction.52 In practice, the states
have challenged mergers under more stringent thresholds than
those applied by federal authorities, 53 and have used their
47 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 21, STATE MERGER
ENFORCEMENT 67-70 (1995) [hereinafter STATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT]
(discussing the conflict between federal and state guidelines and the resulting
confusion to the public).
48 See id. ("[Dlifferences in state and federal merger enforcement philosophies
can produce substantial complications.").
49 See id. at 65-70 (documenting state government preferences for more
aggressive application of federal antitrust controls on mergers).
50 National Association of Attorneys General, Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,406 (1993).
51 See STATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT, supra note 47, at 66-68 (analyzing
respects in which NAAG merger guidelines stake out broader enforcement terrain
than federal merger guidelines).
52 See California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284-85 (1990)
(explaining that merger enforcement by private persons, including state
governments, was "an integral part of the congressional plan for protecting
competition"); AlliedSignal, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 183 F.3d 568, 575 (7th Cir.
1999) ("Courts do not generally defer to an agency's decision not to challenge a
merger.").
53 See, e.g., New York v. Krat General Foods, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). For a discussion of the New York Attorney General's challenge to the
purchase by Kraft General Foods of the ready-to-eat cereal operations of RJR
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enforcement power to block business restructurings that would
reduce employment within their borders.54 State intervention to
review and challenge a merger would be justifiable where the
merger's effects occur entirely or chiefly within that state's
borders, and the transaction does not raise larger competition
policy concerns that affect the nation as a whole.55 The states
have not so delimited their merger enforcement efforts to date;
instead, they have devoted considerable resources to reviewing
transactions that have major national competition policy
implications and fully occupy the attention of the federal
antitrust agencies. As a result, firms must spend resources
anticipating and accommodating the desires of state antitrust
officials, even if it means providing concessions that federal
officials do not demand.
The autonomy of state antitrust officials to shape merger
policy and resist federal policy preferences confronts federal
authorities with a difficult choice. Federal antitrust officials can
publicly criticize state participation in the review of transactions
with national significance, but past efforts by federal officials to
discourage state involvement by condemning state intervention
have failed to stymie state participation and may have
strengthened the states' resolve to persevere.56  A second
Nabisco, see Ronald A. Stem, New Directions for a New Administration 5-7,
Remarks prepared for the Conference Board's Program on Antitrust Issues in
Today's Economy (Mar. 3, 1993) (mimeo).
54 See Pennsylvania v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
70,224, 70,095 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (denying the state's motion for a preliminary
injunction against the acquisition of a company's competitor); Stanley Works v.
Newell Co., 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 70,008, 68,896-97 (D. Conn. 1992) (ordering
enforcement of an agreement between the state and Newell in which Newell agreed
to discontinue its effort to acquire a competitor and to sell all concurrently-held
interests in that competitor); see also STATE MERGER ENFORCEMENT, supra note 47,
at 69-70 (discussing employment-related concerns that motivated the state's
decision to prosecute in Russell Stover and Newell).
55 See Robert H. Lande, When Should States Challenge Mergers: A Proposed
Federal/State Balance, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1047, 1072-89 (1990) (suggesting
that the allocation of responsibility between federal and state antitrust regulators
depends upon the size of transactions and the geographic area in which a
transaction has its principal competitive effects).
56 During Ronald Reagan's Presidency, top leadership at the FTC and the
Justice Department publicly deplored state government efforts to expand their role
in reviewing mergers. See 60 Minutes with Charles F. Rule, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 381 (1989) (stating that state
attorneys general "are] more interested in headlines than in sound law
enforcement, [and] have begun to use antitrust enforcement as a means of
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approach is for the federal agencies to cooperate with the states
and seek to convince the states of the wisdom of the federal
enforcers' preferences. During the Bush Administration, and
with greater intensity during the Clinton Administration,
federal antitrust officials have pursued a strategy of cooperation
and persuasion. By this approach, the federal agencies hope to
co-opt state authorities by publicly acknowledging the states as
partners or co-equals in public antitrust enforcement, and
undertaking collaborative activities such as the establishment of
information-sharing and joint enforcement efforts.5 7 The federal
officials' apparent hope is that through extended contact and
cooperation, the FTC and the Justice Department will pull state
policy increasingly within the orbit of federal analytical
methodologies and enforcement tastes.
The federal agencies may temper some of the most
expansive enforcement impulses of the state governments, but
no amount of federal-state cooperation will yield harmonized
policies that converge on federal norms. As a condition for
harmonization, state officials will force federal agencies to make
concessions that broaden the zone of liability beyond the limits
that the federal agencies, acting alone, would establish. The
states will resist and retard efforts by federal officials to
implement competition policies that loosen limits on mergers. 58
advancing their political careers"); Daniel Oliver, Federal and State Antitrust
Enforcement: Constitutional Principles and Policy Considerations, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1245 (1988) (presenting the FTC Chairman's criticism of the expansion of
state enforcement). These attacks did not diminish the enthusiasm of state officials
to challenge mergers and other behavior under the federal antitrust laws. See Lloyd
Constantine, The States' Role in Challenging National Mergers Is Vital, 3
ANTITRUST 37, 38 (1989) (presenting the observation by the principal state antitrust
enforcement official that "antitrust practitioners know where to go to speak with
people who are still seriously interested in enforcing the law that Congress enacted.
These people work for NAAG and the state attorneys general").
57 In 1998, the FTC, the Justice Department, and state attorneys general
established a protocol for coordinating the review of mergers. See Protocol for
Coordination in Merger Investigations Between the Federal Enforcement Agencies
and State Attorneys General (last modified Mar. 11, 1998) <http-//www.usdoj.gov/
atr/publicdguidelines/1773.htm>.
58 See Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based
Competition (Nov. 7, 1995) (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/
opp/global/macleod.htm> (prepared statement of William C. MacLeod) ("Even if the
Commission recognizes... dynamic efficiencies, the failure of state regulators to
recognize the welfare effects of nonprice competition threatens to block beneficial
transactions."); see also Kevin J. O'Connor, Efficiencies: Should Current Antitrust
Policy Be Changed?, Comments Before the FTC's Hearing on Changing Nature of
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Where federal authorities seek to establish more permissive
public enforcement policies toward consolidation and desire such
policies to be truly national in scope, they must either persuade
the states to accept such policies or convince Congress to limit
the states' role in merger oversight for transactions with
significant regional or national effects.
Merger enforcement is not the only area of antitrust activity
in which the states exert a powerful influence on the formulation
of national competition policy. NAAG's approach to distribution
practices is generally more interventionist than the preferences
of the federal antitrust agencies. NAAG's 1995 Vertical
Restraints Guidelines59 prescribe enforcement approaches-such
as a willingness to use criminal sanctions to challenge resale
price maintenance6 0-that the federal antitrust agencies are
unlikely to endorse. Since 1992, the federal agencies have joined
the states in challenging minimum resale price maintenance
(RPM).61 The states have matched the federal agencies in
attacking RPM and non-price vertical restraints.62 During the
Competition in a Global and Innovation-Driven Age (Nov. 7, 1995) (visited Feb. 12,
2000) <http.//www.ftc.gov/opp/globaYoconnor.htm> (prepared statement by the head
of NAAG's Antitrust Task Force observing that when drafting NAAG Merger
Guidelines, "it seemed to many states that the Federal Guidelines gave too much
weight and credence to efficiency arguments in mergers").
69 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
GUIDELINES, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,400 (1995) [hereinafter
NAAG, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES]; see also National Association of
Attorneys General, NAAG Resolution, Executive Summary & Summary of
Comments on Revisions to Vertical Restraints Guidelines, reprinted in 68 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 435 (Mar. 30, 1995).
60 See NAAG, VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 21,153
("Although such criminal challenges have been infrequent, RPM may be prosecuted
by the attorneys general in appropriate cases where state antitrust laws provide for
criminal sanctions.").
61 See United States v. California SunCare, Inc., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) J
70,843 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (analyzing a Justice Department consent decree banning a
producer of indoor tanning products from imposing RPM on its dealers); David A.
Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 9 CORNELL J. L. &
PUBLIC POLY 61, 97-102 (1999) (describing FTC RPM initiatives during the Clinton
Administration).
62 See, e.g., New York v. Reebok Intl Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532, 533 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (discussing a consent decree settling minimum RPM allegations against a
shoe manufacturer); New York v. Keds Corp., 1994-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 70,549
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enforcing an agreement between the company, the fifty states, and
the District of Columbia pursuant to which Keds agreed to pay damages and
discontinue its RPM policies); New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting a challenge to the use of exclusive territories).
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United States Supreme Court's deliberations in State Oil Co. v.
Khan63 that led to the Court's reversal of the per se ban on
maximum RPM, over thirty states filed a joint amicus curiae
brief urging the Court to retain the per se prohibition.64 Both
the FTC and the Justice Department filed briefs supporting the
use of a rule-of-reason test for maximum RPM.65
A final noteworthy area of state participation in formulating
national competition policy concerns dominant firms. The recent
government suits against Microsoft underscore the anomalies of
multiplicity in public antitrust enforcement.66 Microsoft has
been the subject of close attention by federal antitrust officials
since the late 1980s. 67 On May 18, 1998, the Justice Department
filed a complaint accusing the software giant of illegal restraints
of trade under section one of the Sherman Act and of illegal
monopolization and attempted monopolization under section two
of the Sherman Act.68  On the same day, twenty state
governments jointly filed a parallel action,69 which the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia consolidated
with the federal government's case.70 The Justice Department
and the states have cooperated in gathering evidence, deposing
witnesses, and in conducting the trial, although the Justice
Department played the dominant role in questioning witnesses
63 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
64 See Brief of Thirty-Three States and the Territory of Guam in Support of
Respondents, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (No. 96-871), available in
1996 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 871.
65 See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici
Curiae Supporting Reversal, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (No. 96-871),
available in 1996 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 871.
66 For an extensive analysis of the government lawsuits against Microsoft, see
John E. Lopatka and William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft and the
Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 157 (1999); Steven C.
Salop and R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. (1999); Symposium, United States
v. Microsoft, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1245 (1999); Richard M. Steuer, Browsing the
Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 5 (1999).
67 For the history of the federal antitrust agencies' scrutiny of Microsoft, see
William H. Page, Microsoft and the Public Choice Critique of Antitrust, 44
ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 12-30 (1999).
68 See Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (visited Apr. 8, 2000)
<http:I/www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm>.
69 See Complaint, New York v. Microsoft Corp., (visited Apr. 8, 2000)
<www.naag.org/features/microsoft/court.htm >.
70 See Microsoft Press Release: States File Antitrust Lawsuit Against Microsoft
(visited July 13, 2000) <http'//www.naag.org/features/microsoft/pr3.htm>.
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and making arguments at trial.
71
Despite their limited role in the courtroom, the states have
considerable power to limit the Justice Department's freedom to
define and prosecute the Microsoft case. Most important, the
states have a strong voice in negotiating settlement terms or
shaping the position of the government plaintiffs with respect to
remedies. The Justice Department is unlikely to welcome a
public disagreement with its co-plaintiff, particularly if the
states depict the Antitrust Division as being too soft on the
defendant. To avoid engaging in a debate with the state
plaintiffs over whether the Justice Department's litigation
strategy is sufficiently aggressive, the Justice Department will
probably go to great lengths in order to accommodate state
preferences. In doing so, the chief antitrust enforcement body of
the United States necessarily loses a substantial measure of
control over its own case.72 In effect, the disposition of the
federal government's Microsoft antitrust case-one of the most
significant in over a century of experience under the Sherman
Act-depends significantly on the preferences of state
government officials who are not accountable to the public as a
whole, and may be far more receptive than the Justice
Department to entreaties from parochial interests within their
own boundaries.73
One can only wonder about the Justice Department's
unvarnished assessment of what is added or lost through its
partnership with the states in the federal Microsoft litigation.
Does the Justice Department lack the institutional capacity and
courage to prosecute the case vigorously and effectively by itself?.
Do the states have special insight into the interests of consumers
that the Antitrust Division tends to undervalue? If the states'
presence in the Microsoft case as prosecutors is desirable, would
71 See James V. Grimaldi, Microsoft Trial Puts States in Back Seat Out for
Blood, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 30979770 (describing
the limited role of state attorneys general in conducting the Microsoft trial).
72 See id. (describing the interplay between state plaintiffs and the Department
of Justice throughout the Microsoft suit).
73 See Christopher Georges, Politics Play a Role in States' Status in Microsoft
Suit, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1998, at A24 (describing political motivations for
participation and non-participation by various state governments in the Microsoft
case); but see Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Local Politics and the Microsoft Suit, N.J.L.J.,
June 8, 1998, at 24 ("NAAG is not free from the political interests of its members.
But contrary to some detractors, these joint efforts are more fully shaped by diligent
staff work than by those aspiring to governorship.").
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it be useful for the states to shadow the Justice Department or
the FTC in other civil cases of substantial national importance?
A fuller discussion by the U.S. antitrust community would help
answer these questions and evaluate the wisdom of having two
or more public enforcement authorities prosecute the same
conduct.74 Perhaps it is only through the litigation of cases and
the establishment of binding doctrinal constraints by the federal
courts that national competition policy will truly be harmonized
and the fragmenting influences of individual public prosecutors
can be curbed.
B. The Case of Regulated Industries
In the energy and telecommunications sectors, many
government bodies share authority to formulate competition
policy. Parties to a merger in the energy or telecommunications
industries are subject to challenge on competition grounds by the
federal antitrust agencies, the federal sectoral regulators (the
Federal Communications Commission or the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission), the attorney general of any state in
which they do business, and the public service commission (PSC)
of every state in which they operate. 75 The competition policy
mandates of the federal sectoral regulators and the state PSCs
are not identical to the mandate of the FTC and the Justice
Department under the federal antitrust laws, but are broad
enough to permit the sectoral regulators and states to examine
the same issues as the federal antitrust agencies and reach
different outcomes. Municipal authorities have also asserted the
right to impose competition policy conditions upon mergers of
cable television system operators.76
74 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy (Sept. 14, 2000)
(proposing substantial retrenchment of power of state governments to file suits
under Federal antitrust laws), available at <http'/www.techlawjournal.com/atr/
2000914posner.asp>.
75 See generally William E. Kovacic, The Impact of Domestic Jurisdictional
Multiplicity on the International Harmonization of Competition Policy (June 1999)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for the International Competition Policy
Advisory Committee) (on file with author) (discussing the framework for
competition policy analysis of mergers in sectors formerly or currently subject to
extensive public utility regulation).
76 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently disapproved an
effort by the City of Portland to mandate open access to a local cable television
network's high-speed data system as a condition for transferring its local cable
television franchise to AT&T as part of a merger agreement. See AT&T Corp. v. City
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The possibility of applying inconsistent or contradictory
standards under the status quo is substantial. The federal
antitrust agencies and sectoral regulators may apply different
standards of review, and these standards, in turn, may deviate
from the approaches used by state regulators. One cannot
imagine proposing to a transition economy that it subject
mergers involving regulated firms to independent competition
policy reviews by two national regulation entities (the antitrust
agency and the sectoral regulator), by the state attorneys
general (using their status as plaintiffs under the federal
antitrust laws), and by state regulators in every jurisdiction in
which the parties operate.
III. TRANSPARENCY
A basic principle of law is that the rationale for public
policies and the process by which public instrumentalities make
policy be transparent. Transparency is an important antidote to
many pathologies of public administration. It promotes clarity
in policy formation, increases the understanding of legal
commands by affected parties, and disciplines the exercise of
discretion by public officials by subjecting their actions to
external review and criticism.77 Western advisors frequently
urge transition economy antitrust agencies to increase the
transparency of policymaking.7 8 Transparent policymaking
methods are suggested as a means to inform external observers
(especially business operators) about the content and rationale of
of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876-80 (9th Cir. 2000).
77 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge for Development: Economic Science,
Economic Policy, and Economy Advice, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998, at 9,40 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds.,
1999) ("Governments in many countries have a strong proclivity for secrecy....
Secrecy provides more scope for the work of special interest groups, greater cover for
corruption, and greater opportunities for hiding mistakes.").
78 See, e.g., Claudio R. Frischtak, The Changed Role of the State: Regulatory
Policies and Reform in a Comparative Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND
REFOIat A COIPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 13 (Claudio R. Frischtak ed., 1995)
("Administrative decisions must be ... transparent and subject to judicial review.");
Khemani & Dutz, Instruments of Competition Policy, supra note 13, at 28
(emphasizing the importance of transparent decisionnaking processes); Russell W.
Pittman, Second Annual Latin American Competition and Trade Round Table:
Introduction, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 263, 274 (1999) ("A young [competition
enforcement] agency must establish its credibility both within the government and
among the population. All of this calls for careful case selection, transparent and
predictable enforcement, and public explanation of decisions.").
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specific decisions, and to ensure the regularity and honesty of
public administration. Proposed transparency measures include
publishing decisions in law enforcement matters, issuing
guidelines, and using speeches to articulate the basis for specific
initiatives. In several important respects, federal enforcement of
the antitrust laws in the United States lacks the quality of
transparency that Western countries recommend to transition
economy competition systems.
A. The Implications of Policy-Making by Settlement
Since the late 1970s, federal antitrust policy has featured
substantial reliance on consent agreements, a number of which
impose expansive ongoing regulatory oversight.79  Three
principal developments have accounted for this trend. The first
is the transformation of the merger review process resulting
from the interplay between the premerger notification
mechanism created by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 197680 and the "fix-it-first" approach that
the federal antitrust agencies adopted in the 1980s. 81 The
second is the increasing frequency with which antitrust officials
confront access and interconnection issues at the boundary
between traditional public utility regulation and antitrust
doctrine in industries such as energy and telecommunications. 82
The third is the apprehension of antitrust officials about trying
79 See, e.g., Warren S. Grimes, The ABA Consent Decree: Reflections on
oversight of the Consent Process, ANTITRUST, Fall 1995, at 25, 27 (concluding that
there is an increasing use of consent decrees); A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The
New Regulation, ANTITRUST, Fall 1995, at 13, 13-14 (pinpointing adverse aspects of
consent decrees); Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing
Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1408-17 (1998) (discussing
use of consent decrees in a vast majority of antitrust decisions).
80 Pub. L. No. 94-435, Title H, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18a (1994)). For a description of the pre-merger notification mechanism,
see William Blumenthal, Overenforcement in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request
Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 15 (Malcolm B. Coate &
Andrew N. Kleit eds., 1996).
81 See generally Symposium, Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger
Enforcement, 65 ANTITRUST L. J. 813 (1997) (analyzing the importance of the pre-
merger notification mechanism in identifying and resolving competitive concerns
involving mergers and acquisitions).
82 See, e.g., United States v. MCI Communications Corp., 1994-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 91 70,730 (D.D.C. 1994) (discussing the Antitrust Division consent decree
permitting the joint venture between MCI and British Telecom and imposing anti-
discrimination safeguards and reporting requirements).
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cases before federal judges who, as a group, have relatively
conservative antitrust preferences and are likely to view
government (or private) antitrust claims more skeptically than
the judiciary of the 1960s and early 1970s.8 3
The increased use of consent agreements as policy-formation
tools poses a number of problems. Most problems result from the
limited transparency concerning the rationale for accepting a
consent agreement. Limited transparency makes it difficult for
those other than the parties to the negotiations to determine the
basis or significance that should be attributed to the consent
agreement.8 4 Press releases and competitive impact statements
that accompany the announcement of Antitrust Division or FTC
consent decrees usually contain highly stylized statements of the
facts that portray the enforcement agency's decision to prosecute
in the most favorable light. To establish the wisdom of their
acts, and to convince non-participants, including legislators and
consumers, that they executed their responsibilities
appropriately, the enforcement agencies limit their disclosures to
identifying perceived competition concerns and to providing
assurances that the relief obtained has corrected serious
competition problems.
Consent agreements also provide an attractive opportunity
for enforcement officials to portray their work as path-breaking
and innovative, and thereby distinguish it from the
accomplishments of previous management. Public officials
rarely define their mission as consisting of the competent
83 See William E. Kovacic, Judicial Appointments and the Future of Antitrust
Policy, ANTITRUST, Spring 1993, at 8; William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial
Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (1991).
84 See Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based
Competition (Oct. 17, 1995) (statement of Thomas B. Leary) (visited July 14, 2000)
<http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GClO1795.htm> (recommending that the FTC
provide the business community with more information about its merger
enforcement decisions and the rationale for consent agreements); cf Federal Trade
Commission, Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition (Oct. 23, 1995)
(statements by Stephen A. Stack, Jr., and Dr. Allen Bloom) (visited April 8, 2000)
<http'J/www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC102395.htm> (advocating greater transparency in
the Commission's decisional process relating to transactions involving
pharmaceutical products that are under development); Federal Trade Commission,
Hearings on Global Commerce and Innovation (Oct. 26, 1995) (prepared statement
of Robert A. Skitol) (visited July 14, 2000) <http'/www.%ftc.gov/opp/global/
sldtoll.htm> (stating that "there is a certain 'black magic' quality and lack of
transparency about [Commission] decision-making, particularly about the
conclusions reached on high-visibility, controversial transactions").
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execution of programs begun by their predecessors, especially
predecessors in a previous presidential administration.8 5 Most
appointees to significant government bureaus feel compelled to
identify distinctive accomplishments. The impulse to
differentiate the product of one's stewardship is especially strong
when the change in Presidents involves a change in political
control of the White House. What, after all, is the purpose of
changing parties if not to carry out different policies?
In the first term of the Clinton Presidency, the need for
federal antitrust officials to demonstrate distinctive
accomplishments resulted, in part, from greater congressional
appropriations for enforcement. During Clinton's first term as
President, the Antitrust Division persuaded Congress to restore
a large part of the funds cut during the Reagan Administration.8 6
To justify this result, the Clinton Justice Department had to
show Congress that taxpayers were getting value for additional
expenditures.8 7 Emphasizing the number of new initiatives and
characterizing them as qualitatively distinctive serve as two
ways to demonstrate that the funds have been well spent. The
product differentiation impulse frequently manifests itself in
exaggerations by enforcement officials about the novelty and
importance of their programs. Such exaggerations often occur in
speeches that depict comparatively isolated or minor consent
agreements as portending major departures from past practice.88
85 George Hay makes this point as follows:
No one likes to give speeches without having something to say, and a
speech which simply says "business as usual," or even "we are going to
work hard and do an even better job on the usual matters," is not likely to
make the evening news, however reassuring such a pronouncement might
be to the audience or the business community at large.
George A. Hay, Innovations in Antitrust Enforcement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 7, 7 (1995).
86 By 1989, the Reagan Administration had reduced the Antitrust Division and
the FTC to approximately half of the size that the two agencies had attained in
1980. By 1996, Congress had restored the personnel of the Antitrust Division to
nearly 80 percent of its 1980 level. See Albert A. Foer, The Federal Antitrust
Commitment: Providing Resources to Meet the Challenge, Table 1 (American
Antitrust Institute: Mar. 1999), available at <http://www/antitrustinstitute.org(
whitepaper.pdf>.
87 See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-
Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended
Consequences Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 882-83 n.65
(1997) (discussing the sharp increase of merger complaints with the Clinton
Administration and listing merger cases during Clinton's tenure).
88 See Hay, supra note 85, at 8 ("[Slpeeches often reflect more what an
administration would like to do, or would like an audience to think that it will do,
[Vol.74:361
2000] LESSONS OF COMPETITION POLICY REFORM 3811
Perhaps the clearest recent example of exaggerated product
differentiation is the importance that the Clinton Administration
attributed to its efforts to examine competitive effects in the
context of "innovation market[s]."89
The observers having the most informed perspective on the
government's claims about the value and significance of consent
decrees are often the respondent firms. In theory, firms subject
to consent decrees might challenge the government's
exaggerations about the rationale and scope of such agreements.
In practice, the statements of the private signatories are usually
tame and meaningless. Though they have the information to
point out enforcement agency puffery, their incentives to do so
are weak. The increasingly regulatory nature of the functions
performed by the antitrust agencies has induced business
operators to pull their punches. 90 The greater emphasis on
negotiated settlements spurred by the Hart-Scott-Rodino process
has changed the relationship between the enforcement agencies
and the outside parties (e.g., the private bar, the consulting
firms, and the companies subject to antitrust oversight) with
whom they deal.91 The repeat-game nature of the regulatory
process discourages private entities from engaging in candid
public discussion of the merits of settlements to which they are
parties. This inhibits the revelation of information needed to
assess the effects of negotiated agreements, although in rare
occasions competitors and others have mounted formal
challenges to the approval of settlements.
Extensions of the regulatory process through greater
reliance on negotiated arrangements also expand the class of
service providers, such as law firms and economic consulting
firms, whose well-being depends on the antitrust industry.92 The
private bar and private consulting groups that might be
rather than what it has done, is now doing, or will actually do in the near future.").
89 Symposium, A Critical Appraisal of the "Innovation Market" Approach, 64
ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1995).
90 See Sims & Herman, supra note 87, at 865-67 (discussing the effects of
regulatory agencies on business strategy).
91 See id. at 883 (noting that the lack of public information about consent decree
negotiations has left many uninformed about how the agencies are handling these
situations).
92 See id. at 869 ("This transformation of merger practice from litigation to very
comprehensive regulation has been good for the Washington antitrust bar, the
principal beneficiary for the enormous demand for antitrust regulatory lawyers that
has been created.").
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informative participants in debates about government
enforcement have become increasingly timid sources of criticism.
In an interview in 1995, Robert Litan, who served as a deputy to
Anne Bingaman, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust,
described the cause of this phenomenon: "Most antitrust lawyers
in Washington are very happy with Anne [Bingaman].... Even
though they have to litigate against her, she is making them
quite rich."93  The riches from representing parties before
government agencies often mute the service provider and leave
the heavy lifting of criticism to corporate clients, or to outsiders
such as academics, who frequently dine from the same
consulting feedbag and are either equally desirous of repeat
business or do not know the details of the enforcement process.
Private signatories to consent decrees will seldom offer an
informative discussion of the facts or policy arguments that
weighed against intervention or provide information that would
allow an external observer to construct the relevant arguments.
Over time, the fuller context surrounding a consent
agreement becomes somewhat clearer as enforcement officials
give speeches, as news organizations conduct inquiries, and as
enforcement officials, respondents, or external advisors reveal
what took place during deliberations between the enforcement
agency and the firm.94  A more complete picture of the
underlying decision often emerges over time, but the picture and
the means that generate it are unsatisfying. Many elements of
the picture are articulated informally by agency officials and
respondents, and lack the certainty that permits outsiders to
make confident judgments about future enforcement. 95 The
process puts a premium on the ability of insiders with access to
enforcement officials to gain insight into how discretion was in
fact exercised.
To a considerable extent, the phenomenon described here is
the inevitable result of creating any system of regulation. All
regulation involves the exercise of discretion, and information
about the preferences and tendencies of the public officials who
93 Stephen Labaton, At Justice, The Taming of a Whirlwind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
22, 1995, § 3, at 1.
94 See 60 Minutes with the Honorable Janet D. Steiger, Chairman, Federal
Trade Commission, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 177, 184 (1991) (describing how the FTC
conveys rules through speeches and articles on a variety of topics).
95 See Sims & Herman, supra note 87, at 883.
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exercise the discretion will always be valuable. And because the
information that formally accompanies the release of consent
agreements is so austere and incomplete, the emphasis on
consent agreements as policy instruments magnifies the role of
enforcement agency discretion and correspondingly increases the
reliance on Washington insiders as a means for identifying and
articulating the basis for the exercise of such discretion. 96
The incomplete and often one-sided nature of the
information surrounding a consent agreement has another
important consequence. Inadequate disclosures of settlement-
relevant information not only make it difficult for outsiders to
identify what the enforcement agency has done and why it has
intervened, but they also impede efforts by outsiders to evaluate
the wisdom of the decision to prosecute. Unlike a trial, which
usually generates a relatively rich, publicly available record, the
consent agreement supplies little basis for outsiders to evaluate
the enforcement agency's strategy and tactics. 97 One is left to
sift through the enforcement agency's announcement that it has
gained valuable relief and the respondent's vague public
suggestions that, while it accepted the remedy, the transaction
emerged essentially unscathed.
B. Possible Improvements
How can the transparency of the consent process be
increased and the quality of enforcement agency choices be
evaluated more effectively? One approach is for enforcement
agencies to issue competitive impact statements that include a
96 See Malcolm R. Pfimder, Developments in Merger Law and Enforcement
1989-90, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 328 (1990) (stating that the author cannot give
much information about the consent decrees for the years 1989 and 1990 because
"the Commission uses boilerplate pleadings").
97 See Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based
Competition (Oct. 25, 1995) (statement of Michael Sobn) (visited July 15, 2000)
<http/www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GC102595.htm>. Mr. Sohn notes that previous
federal enforcement concerning innovation markets has occurred when the research
and development overlap is a small part of a much "larger transaction." Id. In such
a context, "the parties have strong incentives to Tix' the problem" quickly and go
forward regardless of their assessment of the merits of the Commission's case. Id.
Mr. Sohn suggests that we may well continue to have enforcement by consent order
without the important safeguard provided by the litigation alternative or even a
vigorous defense at the enforcement agency level. See id. In that context, Mr. Sohn
suggests that "it's very important that the Commission clearly set forth and
consistently apply its enforcement principals." Id.
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fuller discussion of the arguments that the respondent raised on
its own behalf and clearly specify the agency's reasons for
discounting or rejecting those arguments. 98 Furthermore, in
speeches, the Antitrust Division and the FTC could reveal more
information about why they decide not to intervene to challenge
or modify specific transactions. 99
A second approach is to rely on periodic ex post audits to
examine and evaluate the decision-making process and to
consider the effects of the consent agreement. As described
below, 100 the ex post audit would be performed by an individual
or entity outside the agency and having no relationship to the
respondent or industry members affected by the consent
agreement. The results of the audits would be made public. For
example, audits would be especially useful in determining the
value of firewalls and anti-discrimination mandates as tools for
resolving concerns about vertical mergers in sectors such as
telecommunications and defense.
A third approach is to rely more extensively on litigation to
clarify and establish legal principles. 1 1 Since 1995, the Clinton
Administration's antitrust agencies have made a conscious
commitment to increase recourse to litigation as a tool for
shaping policy.10 2 The most important and visible area of
attention is the renewed concern over dominant firms. The most
prominent initiatives have been the Justice Department's case
against Microsoft10 3 and the FTC's prosecution of Intel, 104 which
98 See Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on Global Commerce and
Innovation, supra note 84 (prepared statement of Robert A. Skitol) (proposing that,
to aid public comment, the FTC reveal the bases for its decision to intervene).
99 See id.
100 See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
101 See Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The Second Annual
Bernstein Lecture, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1998) (analyzing the advantages of
litigation over the use of guidelines, reports, speeches, and settlements as a method
for clarifying doctrine and establishing policy).
102 See John R. Wilke & Bryan Gruley, Trustbuster Joel Klein, Once Viewed as
Timid, Faces a Very Full Plate, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1998, at Al (describing the
Justice Department's expanded emphasis on antitrust litigation as a tool for policy
development); William E. Kovacic, The Crusade Against Monopolists, CORP.
COUNS., June 1999, at 44 (discussing revival of the federal government's antitrust
litigation efforts).
103 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text; see also United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 59-74 (D.D.C. 2000) (final judgment); United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 30-57 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of
law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 9-112 (D.D.C. 1999)
(findings of fact).
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resulted in a settlement. Had it been tried to a conclusion, the
Intel matter would have provided an influential test of the FTC's
effort to expand the duty of a dominant firm to continue to deal
with suppliers who may also be competitors. The Microsoft case
remains a vital vehicle for defining the content of rules
governing exclusive dealing, tying, invitations to collude,
predatory pricing, and innovation. 05  Lesser known but
significant matters include a Justice Department predatory
pricing case against American Airlines 10 6  and an FTC
administrative trial of pharmaceutical producers accused of
using the settlement of patent infringement claims to restrict
competition from generic drugs. 10 7 The litigation of these and
other pending matters could generate judicial decisions that
clarify antitrust doctrine in areas where settlements and
guidelines have dominated agency policymaking. 08
IV. RECONCILING NOMINAL LEGAL COMMANDS AND
ENFORCEMENT POLICY: THE TREATMENT OF DISTRIBUTION
PRACTICES
In 1993, the Clinton Administration announced its intention
to expand enforcement of prohibitions against vertical
restraints. 10 9  Among her first policy moves as Assistant
104 See In re Intel Corp., 1999 FTC Lexis 145, at *1 (Aug. 3, 1999) (entering
consent agreement).
105 See Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, The Justice Department, and
Antitrust Theory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 621, 622 (1996) ("The sparring between the
Justice Department and Microsoft over these Department challenges to Microsoft's
plans may reveal something about the antitrust laws and about the Department's
current views of what those laws are about.").
103 See Complaint, United States v. AMR Corp. (visited April 8, 2000)
<http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2400/2438.htm>.
107 See In re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. et. Al., Dkt. No. 9293 (F.T.C. Mar.
16, 2000), available at <http'//wvw.ftc.gov/os2000/03/hoechstandrax.complaint.
htm.>.
103 Other noteworthy cases include Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding a violation of section five of the
FTC Act by the nation's leading toy retailer for using group boycott and exclusive
dealing arrangements to deny discount retailers access to popular toys); see also
Complaint, United States v. Dentsply Intl, Inc. (visited March 13, 2000)
<http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2100/2164.htm>; Complaint, United States v. VISA
U.S.A. Inc. (visited March 13, 2000) <http//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/fl900/
1973.htm> (challenging restrictions that the VISA and Mastercard credit card
networks impose on their members concerning the issuance of credit cards issued by
rival networks).
109 See generally Janet L. McDavid & Richard M. Steuer, The Law of Vertical
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Attorney General, Anne Bingaman issued a highly-publicized
retraction of the Reagan Administration's enforcement
guidelines for non-price vertical restraints. 110 The FTC's current
chairman, Robert Pitofsky, is one of the strongest defenders of
the per se ban against minimum resale price maintenance
(RPM) and a vigorous critic of the Reagan Administration's
policy of non-intervention."'
Despite the much-heralded shift in policy, the precise
dimensions of Clinton Administration enforcement intentions for
distribution practices remain unclear. The Clinton Antitrust
Division and the FTC took no steps to replace the Reagan
guidelines with their own comprehensive statement about the
appropriate content of vertical restraints policy. For example, it
is unclear whether the Clinton enforcement agencies are
committed to defending the rule of per se illegality for minimum
RPM to the last round, even to the point of precluding exceptions
for new entrants, new products, or failing companies. 112 Neither
the Antitrust Division nor the FTC have offered a comprehensive
statement of their views on issues such as tying and exclusive
dealings. It would have been appropriate for the Clinton
enforcement agencies to prepare their own policy statement
about the proper focus for vertical restraints enforcement. A
comprehensive policy statement would have provided useful
guidance regarding the government's views about the best use of
its vertical restraints enforcement authority, just as the Justice
Department's 1982 merger guidelines illuminated the
Restraints in Franchise Cases and Summary Adjudication: The Revival Of
Franchise Antitrust Claims, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 209 (1999).
110 See Anne K Bingaman, Address to the ABA's Antitrust Section, reprinted in
65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 250 (Aug. 12, 1993).
M See generally Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy in a Clinton Administration,
62 ANTITRUST L.J. 217 (1993) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy].
112 But see John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Posner's Program for the
Antitrust Division: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 48 SMU L. REV. 1713, 1724
(1995) (stating that the Clinton Administration seems to be taking a "more activist
approach"); Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per
Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1495 (1983) (suggesting
the appropriateness of limited exceptions to per se illegality for minimum RPM).
The Antitrust Division and the FTC filed amicus briefs that endorsed the liability
standard that the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately adopted for maximum RPM in its
recent decision in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). See supra notes 63-65
and accompanying text. In Khan, the Court eliminated the existing per se ban on
maximum RPM and held that such arrangements must be evaluated by the rule of
reason. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 22.
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government's views about merger policy.113
Enforcement policy for the Robinson-Patman Act 14 is a
second area requiring further clarification. Measured by
observable enforcement activity, the Clinton agencies largely
abandoned Robinson-Patman enforcement. 115  Continuing a
policy of non-enforcement that dates back to the 1960s, the
Justice Department during the Clinton Administration initiated
no Robinson-Patman cases.116 Recently, however, the FTC under
Clinton initiated one Robinson-Patman claim against a major
consumer goods manufacturer. 117 Bill Clinton and Ronald
Reagan are the only Presidents whose administrations have
generated no Robinson-Patman cases since the Clayton Act's
price discrimination provisions were amended in 1936. Ronald
Reagan's FTC issued one Robinson-Patman complaint, which the
Clinton FTC dismissed in 1996.118
In early 1993, before he became chair of the FTC, Robert
Pitofsky said that the "nullification of enforcement against resale
price maintenance, despite support for the per se rule in the
Supreme Court and in Congress, was the most indefensible
prosecutorial decision in the last twelve years."1 9 It seems no
more defensible for the federal agencies to have declined, since
1989, to essentially "nullify enforcement of a statute that
113 See U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493,
28,502 (1982); Joseph P. Bauer, Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for Conglomerate Mergers?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 348, 348-51
(1983) (discussing the years prior to the enactment of the Guidelines and how the
Guidelines reflected the governments current interest in horizontal mergers).
114 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
115 There have been occasional indications that the FTC has opened and
conducted nonpublic investigations of possible Robinson-Patman violations in the
1990s. See John B. Kirkwood & K Shane Woods, Robinson-Patman Enforcement at
the FTC: Promoting a Level Playing Field While Protecting Consumers (Apr. 5, 1995)
(presentation by two FTC attorneys describing FTC Robinson-Patman Act activities
in the 1980s and 1990s), reprinted in 38TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR
ON DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING 969 (1999).
116 To put things more accurately, the FTC has recently abandoned Robinson-
Patman (RP) enforcement. The Justice Department exited the RP business over 30
years ago and ceded the RP terrain to the Commission.
117 See In Re McCormick & Co., Dkt. No. c-3939 (F.T.C. Apr. 27, 2000) (entering
a consent order barring unlawful price discrimination) available at
<http//www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/mccormick.do.htm>.
118 See In re Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,109,
at 23,919 (Sept. 10, 1996) (dismissing price discrimination charges against six of the
largest U.S. book publishers).
19 Pitofsky, Antitrust Policy, supra note 111, at 219.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
commentators have stridently criticized but Congress has never
repudiated. The FTC ought to state what it believes to be the
proper circumstances for prosecuting Robinson-Patman
violations and specify the criteria it will use to select cases. If
the FTC has concluded that no (or exceedingly few) good
Robinson-Patman cases exist, it should say so.
The Clinton Administration's inability to find more than one
worthy case in eight years verifies the view of many
commentators that Robinson-Patman compliance costs are so
high, and welfare-enhancing (or at least welfare-neutral) cases
so rare, that the statute should be repealed.120 De facto non-
enforcement is a poor substitute for repeal of the statute.
Western advisors often admonish transition economy
governments to ensure that the formal structure of legal
commands mirrors enforcement policy and to discourage the use
of prosecutorial neglect to soften the hard edges of ill-conceived
statutes. Rather than using prosecutorial discretion to minimize
Robinson-Patman enforcement and effectively circumvent an ill-
conceived law, 121 the U.S. antitrust agencies should call for the
statute's repeal or amendment. If the agencies believe that the
statute has value, they should identify the types of cases that
would serve to realize that value.122
V. Ex POST ASSESSMENT
An important component of Western assistance to transition
economy antitrust agencies has consisted of performing ex post
evaluations of completed enforcement matters and encouraging
new competition bodies to assess the impact of existing
enforcement criteria.123 For several years, small teams of foreign
120 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 523-24 (1995) (describing flaws of the Robinson-
Patman Act and summarizing criticism of its provisions).
121 I know of no instance where an American antitrust advisor has proposed
that a transition economy government create a price discrimination scheme
resembling the Robinson-Patman Act.
122 But see Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and the Fate
of Morton Salt: To Save It, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057 (1999) (providing an
analytical framework for rationalizing the enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act
prohibition of secondary line price discrimination).
123 See JOHN FINGLETON ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE 171 (1995) (discussing competition policy
enforcement in Visegrad countries and urging "greater evaluation and refinement of
the criteria used in making decisions"); J. Luis Guasch, Competition Policy
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experts have met occasionally with transition economy
antimonopoly agencies to review specific cases. Most of these
discussions have taken place with competition authorities in
Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, and
have been organized by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).'24 Typically, foreign
experts spend a week or so with transition economy competition
officials to analyze one or more representative cases. The
outside advisors examine the competition agency's prosecution
files and hear presentations by the transition economy officials
who recount their decision to prosecute and discuss the
responses of the defendant firms. The foreign advisors then offer
a critique of the agency's activity in the matter.
In addition to these case-specific audits, the OECD
periodically conducts comprehensive surveys of enforcement
experience for individual transition economies. 12 Outside
referees base such reports on a detailed examination of the
agency's data on enforcement patterns, interviews and written
questionnaires, and consultation with competition policy experts
and business officials inside the country. Some observers have
proposed that multinational bodies and individual Western
donors increase such monitoring and analysis of transition
economy competition agencies. 126
In principle, one would think that Western competition
agencies would conduct similar reviews of their own work.
Systematic, routine efforts to evaluate the impact of past
enforcement actions should be obvious, necessary ingredients of
responsible antitrust policymaking. This is particularly true for
Advocacy and Regulatory Reform (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript prepared for
the World Bank's First International Program on Competitive Policy, Dec. 13-18,
1998) (on file with author) ("It is imperative that competition agencies...
periodically evaluate the impact (efficiency and distribution) of their decisions and
widely disseminate their findings.").
'? The OECD and other multinational bodies, such as the United Nations and
the World Bank, have played a formative role in building new competition policy
systems in emerging markets. See Rodriguez & Coate, supra, note 10, at 313 (1996)
("Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, multilateral lending institutions and
the antitrust agencies of developed countries have actively collaborated in the
formulation and implementation of these antitrust programs.").
m See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
REGULATORY REFORM: THE HUNGARY COUNTRY REVIEW (1999) (presenting the
results of a study of the activities of the Hungarian Competition Office).
'.6 See Rodriguez & Williams, supra note 30, at 178.
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mature antitrust systems whose participants are aware of the
often problematic judgments and intuitions that underpin
specific enforcement decisions and recognize the important role
that critiques by enforcement policy commentators and specific
judicial decisions have had in the past in spurring adjustments.
When it comes to evaluating outcomes, Western competition
agencies rarely practice what they preach in the transition
environment. The U.S. antitrust agencies spend comparatively
few resources assessing the effect of past initiatives. 127 No
agency has a systematic process for routinely subjecting the
results of past enforcement measures to periodic evaluation. In
a small number of instances, the FTC and the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division have performed retrospective
assessments. These initiatives have added substantially to the
antitrust community's understanding of how various liability
rules influence business behavior and consumer welfare. 123
Expanded efforts to assess the effects of past enforcement
decisions would provide important insights for policymaking.'1
The desirability of devoting greater resources to ex post
evaluation of completed matters was a consistent theme of
competition policy experts who testified at the FTC's hearings in
127 See Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on Market Definition, Market
Power, and Entry in Light of Global Competition (Oct. 18, 1995) (prepared remarks
of Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr.) (visited April 8, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/
lipsky.htm> ("Retrospective research on the accuracy of the economic predictions
underlying previous antitrust decisions is also extremely rare. When the
Commission or a court strikes down a merger, for example, it seldom attempts to
quantify either the efficiencies or the price increases that might result from a
decision for or against the transaction.").
128 See Federal Trade Commission, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES (Ronald N. Lafferty et al. eds., 1984); see
also Timothy F. Bresnahan, Post-Entry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier
Market, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 15 (1985) (presenting results of impact evaluation
funded by the FTC); PETER HUBER, THE GEODESIC NETWORK-1987 REPORT ON
COMPETITION IN THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (U.S. Department of Justice, Jan. 1987)
(evaluating the effects of AT&T divestiture as was mandated by the terms of the
Modified Final Judgment).
129 See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, CLOSER CONTROLS AND BETTER DATA COULD
IMPROVE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 12-18 (1980); KATZMANN, REGULATORY
BUREAUCRACY, supra note 25, at 204-05; William E. Kovacic, Federal Antitrust
Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the
Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases, 12 RES. L. & ECON. 173, 187 (1989);
William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of
the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1147 (1989).
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1995 on innovation and international competition.130
There are a number of reasons why agencies spend little
time evaluating the effects of completed initiatives. An audit
might discredit the agency by revealing that its initiatives either
had no effect or yielded perverse results. Though perfectly
understandable, the possibility of incurring some institutional
discomfort is not a valid policy basis for foregoing audits.
Expense is another obstacle. Audits require the agency to spend
resources that might be devoted directly to pursuing new
13o See Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on the Changing Nature of
Competition in a Global and Innovation-Driven Age (Nov. 2, 1995) (prepared
statement of Norman R. Augustine) (visited April 8, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov.opp/
globalIaugustin.htm> (stating that a study should be conducted to review, say, two
years after the fact, whether the intended outcomes of previous antitrust reviews of
defense industry mergers were actually achieved, and if not, what lessons are to be
learned); Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on Competition Policy (Nov. 14,
1995) (prepared statement of Richard J. Gilbert) (visited April 8, 2000)
<http-/www.ftc.gov/opp/global/gilbert.htm> (urging the FTC "to use its
investigatory powers to learn more about the competitive effects of hospital
mergers.... The Commission could do a great service by undertaking a critical
review of the effects of antitrust enforcement in this industry."); Federal Trade
Commission, Hearings on Market Definition, Market Power, and Entry in Light of
Global Competition (Oct. 18, 1995) (prepared remarks of Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr.),
supra note 127, at 10 ("The Commission should consider whether retrospective
study of the assumptions and results of previous antitrust enforcement efforts
would help to discover whether fundamental but unstated misconceptions about
supply response may underlie some enforcement judgements."); Federal Trade
Commission, Competition Hearings on Global Commerce and Innovation (Nov. 2,
1995) (statement of David Pitts) (visited April 8, 2000) <http/www.ftc.gov/opp/
global/GC110295.htm> (suggesting that the government evaluate whether
anticipated efficiencies in hospital mergers were realized in practice); Federal Trade
Commission, Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition (Nov. 14, 1995)
(statement of Joseph Sims) (visited April 8, 2000) <http-/www.ftc.gov/opp/
global/GCll1495.htm> (proposing that the FTC study the actual effects of hospital
mergers); Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on Global Commerce and
Innovation (Oct. 26, 1995) (prepared statement of Robert A. Skitol) supra note 84,
(proposing that the Commission's Bureau of Economics review experience of
selected consortia that filed notifications under the National Cooperative Research
Act or the National Cooperative Research and Production Act); cf. Federal Trade
Commission, Hearings on the Changing Nature of Competition in a Global and
Innovation-Driven Age (Nov. 7, 1995) (preliminary draft of prepared statement of
Joseph F. Broadley) (visited April 8, 2000) <http'//www.ftc.gov/opp/global/
brodley.htm> (advocating ex post verification that efficiencies claimed for mergers
and joint ventures have materialized); Federal Trade Commission, Hearings on the
Changing Nature of Competition in a Global and Innovation-Driven Age (Oct. 19,
1995) (prepared statement of Phillip B. Nelson) (visited April 8, 2000)
<http:J/www.ftc.gov/opp/global/nelsonl.htm> ("[Ilt appears that the FTC could
perform valuable services by researching and documenting more fully the economic
circumstances under which shipments pattern data can be misleading.").
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matters-activities for which the agency can more readily claim
credit than for conducting studies of past activities. Although
this consideration might legitimately affect the number and
scope of audits, it does not dictate that the optimal level of such
activity is close to zero-especially" when so many features of
antitrust policy, such as the proper approach to merger
analysis-rely heavily on untested intuitions about the effects of
intervention. A third obstacle involves methodology. Evaluating
the effects of some prosecutorial decisions can present difficult
measurement and data collection issues. Yet even relatively
simple analytical models supported by limited data are likely to
provide a more confident basis for policymaking than mere belief
or intuition. In short, all of these reservations might limit the
number and scope of antitrust audits, but they do not justify
foregoing the evident need to analyze past activity as a basis for
determining whether to alter or continue the mix of enforcement
initiatives.
Ex post evaluations could be designed in a number of ways.
One could begin with a simple model in which FTC or Justice
Department personnel regularly conduct audits with no public
disclosure of the results. The government agencies would
establish a process for its own personnel to select completed
enforcement initiatives (both litigated cases and consent
agreements) and analyze their effects. In general, the audits
would consist of reviewing specific enforcement episodes in
detail, studying the deliberative processes of the agencies,
interviewing those involved in the decision to prosecute, and
collecting data on effects, such as by consulting customers or
competitors of the respondents. Internal self-evaluation could be
performed as a collaborative effort involving the litigation offices,
the Bureau of Economics and the Economic Analysis Group, and
policy bodies such as the FTC's Office of Policy Planning. The
results of such assessments could be examined by the
enforcement agencies in internal review sessions. This approach
would be viewed by the institution as the least threatening form
of audit. If the results are unflattering, only the agency will be
aware of them. Performing the analysis with insiders
exclusively provides a measure of assurance that external
disclosure of the results and the agency's thought processes will
not take place.
A second approach is to make the results of the audit public
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in some form. The Antitrust Division and the FTC could issue
public versions of the audits that delete references to sensitive
information such as confidential business data or material that
discloses enforcement intentions regarding pending matters.
Even limited forms of public disclosure increase the
transparency of the agency's operations and decision-making
processes. A recent example of this approach is the FTC's
assessment of outcomes of remedies ordered in merger cases.
131
The merger remedies study was conducted by FTC attorneys and
economists and the agency released a public version of the study.
The FTC remedies study is informative to a degree, but it
provides only a limited basis upon which outsiders can evaluate
how the Commission staff determined whether the agency's past
remedies were effective.
A third method is to have outsiders participate in conducting
the audits. The outsiders could consist of either non-government
employees working under contract to the antitrust agencies, or
employees of government institutions, such as the General
Accounting Office, which have occasionally examined antitrust
enforcement. The level of participation could range from
expansive forms of involvement, such as designing and
performing the studies, to more limited contributions such as
offering comments on studies prepared by agency insiders.
Compared to relying solely on insiders, participation by outsiders
would likely provide more rigorous, critical scrutiny of the
agency's work and increase the credibility of audit results. Even
if an audit were not made public, the agency would obtain a
more meaningful perspective on its work if it engages outsiders
to participate in the process.
An evaluation process that systematically conducts audits
using agency personnel exclusively and makes no public
disclosure of results would be valuable for its tendency to force
the institution to evaluate its work. As suggested above, an
auditing system is likely to be more informative if it engages
outsiders and encompasses disclosure, at least in some form, of
the results. A model for this type of audit-featuring significant
contributions by outsiders and the publication of results-can be
found in a series of antitrust impact evaluations performed by
131 See Federal Trade Commission, A Study of the Commission's Divestiture
Process (Aug. 6, 1999) (visited April 8, 2000) <http'l/wvw.ftc.gov/os/1999/9908/index.
htm#6>.
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the FTC in the late 1970s and early 1980s.13 2
To begin its studies, the Commission retained two
prominent scholars, Richard Caves and Ben Klein, to design
research protocols and hired relatively junior academics to
prepare studies of FTC cases involving vertical restraints and
single-firm exclusionary conduct. The researchers were assigned
to examine the FTC's files and to review publicly-available data
on the industries and practices in question. The researchers
prepared papers that evaluated the Commission's economic
theory, presented a preliminary assessment of the likely effect of
FTC intervention, and proposed a methodology for conducting
further empirical study.
The Commission's impact evaluation team, consisting of
John Kirkwood and Robert Lande from the Bureau of
Competition and Ronald Lafferty from the Bureau of Economics,
chose the researchers on the basis of their scholarly promise and,
to the regret of some FTC litigation offices, not according to the
likelihood that they would deliver favorable assessments of the
agency's work. Kirkwood and his colleagues obtained the
services of an ideologically diverse panel of specialists, many of
whom (including Timothy Bresnahan, Howard Marvel, and
Sharon Oster) have established themselves as leading figures in
the field of industrial organization and business behavior. Their
research yielded a number of important substantive findings,
including the conclusion that antitrust law's categorical
prohibition against minimum resale price maintenance might
reduce efficiency in a significant number of circumstances.
VI. RESTRICTING GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION To SUPPRESS
COMPETITION
Governments frequently restrict business rivalry by limiting
entry into the market, by authorizing producers to cooperate in
setting prices or other terms of commerce, and by granting
exclusive privileges to selected entrepreneurs. 33  In some
132 See Federal Trade Commission, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES, supra note 128 (reporting the results of
these evaluations); Bresnahan, supra note 128 (same).
133 For surveys of these and related forms of government regulation, see JEAN-
JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT
AND REGULATION 538-57 (1993); DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS
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instances, government dispensations from competition serve to
correct market failures.134 In many other cases, regulation that
restricts entry or sets prices enables individual firms or groups
of business operators to gain monopoly rents by suppressing
competition from actual or potential rivals.135 For the most part,
government-imposed restraints on competition are often more
powerful and effective than private restraints, owing to the
government's ability to enforce its will by using the machinery of
the state to punish transgressors with civil sanctions or criminal
penalties. As the scope of government measures to restrict
competition grows, the vitality of a market system can suffer
significantly.
Western advisors often propose that transition economies
empower competition policy authorities to engage in advocacy or
enforcement functions to curb state efforts to suppress
competition. 136 Many transition economies have taken this
advice to heart, perhaps out of their own keen awareness of the
dangers of government intervention born from decades of
intrusive central economic controls. 13 7  Transition economy
competition policy systems contain a variety of tools for
restricting the role of the state. These include subjecting state-
owned enterprises to the same competition policy commands that
govern private enterprises and permitting competition
21-109 (1989); W. KIP VISCUSI & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., EcONOMIcS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 295-329 (1992).
134 See MICHAEL A CREW & PAUL R. KLEINDORFER, THE ECONOMCS OF PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION 3-30 (1986) (describing the rationale for public intervention to
regulate natural monopolies).
135 See PAUL L. JOSKOW & NANCY L. ROSE, The Effects of Economic Regulation,
in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1450, 1469-72 (Richard Schmalensee
& Robert Willig eds. 1989) (describing the U.S. experience with regulation of
airlines and trucking).
136 See WORLD BANK & ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 93-100 (1999) (advocating establishment of
competition advocacy function within the competition policy authority as an element
of adopting new competition law systems); Craig W. Conrath & Barry T. Freeman, A
Response to 'The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing
Countries," 19 N.C. J. INTL L. & COnM REG. 233, 243-45 (1994) (finding competition
policy advocacy to be important element of antimonopoly programs in transition
economies).
137 See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust and Competition Policy in Transition
Economies: A Preliminary Assessment, 2000 FORDHAM1 CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE.
513, 525-26 (B. Hawk, ed. 2000) (summarizing efforts by transition economy
competition agencies to curb government restraints on business rivalry).
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authorities to veto government action that restricts competition,
unless such restrictions have been expressly approved by the
national legislature. 138
As Western consultants counsel transition economies to
resist government intervention that represses business rivalries,
the United States tolerates government intervention that tears
large holes in the fabric of the competition policy regime
embodied in the antitrust laws. At the federal level, Congress
continues to embrace measures, in areas such as agriculture,
that encourage or mandate cooperation by producers to restrict
output and raise prices. 139 By displacing the operation of the
federal antitrust laws, the judicially-created state action
doctrine140 encourages producer groups to elicit government
intervention to forestall competition.141  State measures to
hinder business rivalries that inflict harm solely or chiefly on the
citizens of the jurisdiction adopting the measures leave the
state's voters electoral tools to change such policies. The modern
state action doctrine is not so discriminating, however, for it
confers political immunity on state actors without accounting for
whether the intervention of that state imposes significant
138 See Ben Slay, Industrial De-monopolization and Competition Policy in
Poland, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST
ECONOMIES 123, 143 (Ben Slay ed. 1996) ("Perhaps the [Polish] Antimonopoly
Office's most important (and least-discussed) function has been the advocacy of
liberal, pro-competitive solutions to economic policy problems during the Polish
transition."); Boner & Kovacic, supra note 36, at 10-11 (reviewing Ukraine
Antimonopoly Commission's competition advocacy program); William E. Kovacic &
Ben Slay, Perilous Beginnings: The Establishment of Antimonopoly and Consumer
Protection Programs in the Republic of Georgia, 43 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 15, 39
(1998) (describing measures by Georgia's Antimonopoly Service to block government
ministries from preventing new market entry).
139 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
1135-40 (4th ed. 1997) (describing antitrust exemptions for the agricultural sector).
140 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943) (noting there is "nothing
in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature"); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 139, at 1069-95 (describing the content of the state
action doctrine).
141 See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REV. 713, 714-15 (1986) (discussing that the state action doctrine inspires
regulation that reflects capture of legislators by producer groups seeking to benefit
at the expense of consumer interests).
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adverse economic spillover effects on the citizens of other
states. 142
American policymakers and the U.S. competition policy
community take a remarkably tolerant view of government
intervention forms that Western advisors urge transition
economy governments to resist. The national competition
agencies seem unwilling to spend much political capital opposing
federal statutes, regulations, and administrative practices that
curb rivalry, while transition economy competition agencies are
told that robust efforts to advocate pro-market policies deserve a
high priority. A number of American observers depict state
action immunity as a source of desirable experimentation in
economic regulation by state governments. 143 State antitrust
officials, though sanguine about the value of substantial state
expenditures to supplement federal agency enforcement of
controls against abuse of dominance and mergers, devote
negligible attention to opposing measures by state
instrumentalities that needlessly restrict competition and injure
constituents in their own and other jurisdictions. The
acquiescence in state government intervention that undermines
the attainment of true economic integration throughout the
republic also finds support in United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence that timidly applies the Commerce Clause as a
check on economic rent-seeking by individual states' 44 and
suggests that congressional efforts to abolish or circumscribe the
state action doctrine might constitute impermissible
infringements of state sovereignty.' 45
142 See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust
State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in
Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997) (discussing how state action
jurisprudence fails to incorporate an analysis of adverse spillovers in evaluating
scope of immunity for state intervention that limits competition; proposing that
state action immunity be withheld where one state's acts to suppress business
rivalry imposes significant harm on citizens of other jurisdictions).
143 See Jean Wegman Burns, Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism:
Parker and ARC America Corp., 68 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 29, 44 (2000)
(emphasizing the benefits from state experimentation with different forms of
government intervention).
144 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 142, at 1272-73 & n.228 (noting limits of
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence as a check against state regulation that
restricts competition and imposes adverse spillovers on citizens of other states).
145 See Burns, supra note 143 at 38-39 (concluding that recent U.S. Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the scope of the Eleventh Amendment is likely to
preclude congressional legislative measures to retrench the state action doctrine).
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The phenomenon of rent-seeking through government
intervention at the national or regional levels is arguably more
inimical to economic growth in transition economies than in
mature Western market countries. The United States, after all,
is a prosperous nation and has more margin for error in
pursuing policies that allow producers to reallocate, rather than
press them to expand, society's total wealth. Yet a legal
framework that indulges rent-seeking can be insidious even in a
wealthy country. A country that advises transition economies to
attack government efforts to restrict competition while tolerating
such behavior inside its own borders runs a risk of being deemed
a hypocrite and having its advice ignored. Moreover,
economically perverse limits on entry by new entrepreneurs or
expansion by existing firms can also impose painful social costs
even in a wealthy country by raising prices and retarding
innovation.
Heeding the message conveyed to transition economies
would induce American antitrust institutions to devote more
energy to resisting government policies that suppress
competition. At the national level, this entails greater efforts to
publicize the harmful effects of federal programs that curb
rivalry. If the existing dimensions of state action immunity are
politically or constitutionally immutable, state antitrust bureaus
must assume more responsibility for opposing measures by state
governments and their political subdivisions that restrict
competition. This involves a significant reorientation of state
antitrust priorities that moves at least some resources now
dedicated to pursuing matters treated by federal enforcement
agencies toward efforts to oppose legislative or regulatory
encroachments on the competitive process. The urgency for state
antitrust officials to undertake a robust advocacy role becomes
all the more important if the United States Supreme Court
remains indifferent to state measures that restrict competition
and impose serious adverse spillovers upon other jurisdictions
thereby impeding the functioning of a national economic union.
CONCLUSION
Americans and other Western advisors have devoted
considerable effort to informing transition economy governments
about the key role of institutional design in creating new
competition policy systems. Wise substantive commands are
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meaningless without well-conceived institutions to implement
them. The basic ingredients of good institutional design are
fairly straightforward. First, develop a rational enforcement
structure with clear lines of responsibility and avoid mechanisms
that may generate inconsistent, conflicting policies. Second,
appoint genuine experts to run the competition policy
institution. Third, clearly articulate and explain the basis for
the decision to prosecute and the basis for other policy choices.
Fourth, ensure that nominal legal commands are enforced or
change the nominal commands to match actual enforcement
practice. Fifth, evaluate the effects of completed initiatives.
Finally, vigorously limit government intervention that
suppresses competition. These precepts make sense for both
mature and emerging competition policy systems alike. The
competition policy community in the United States would do well
to measure their own institutions by these tests. By looking
outward at transition economies, we can gain some useful
insights about possibilities for improvements within.
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